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Exploiting social influence in networks
Vladyslav Nora and Eyal Winter |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–27 |
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A dynamic model of censorship
Yiman Sun |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 29–60 |
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Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions
Vitali Gretschko and Helene Mass |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 61–93 |
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Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
Mengxi Zhang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 95–129 |
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Digital currency and privacy
Kee-Youn Kang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 131–167 |
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Asymmetric all-pay auctions with spillovers
Maria Betto and Matthew W. Thomas |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 169–206 |
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Optimal sequential contests
Toomas Hinnosaar |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 207–244 |
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Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
Sarah Auster and Nicola Pavoni |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 245–284 |
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Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public
Xuesong Huang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 285–324 |
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Asset bubbles and product market competition
Francisco Queirós |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 325–364 |
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The dynamics of instability
César Barilla and Duarte Gonçalves |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 365–405 |
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Data and incentives
Annie Liang and Erik Madsen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 407–448 |
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Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game
J. Aislinn Bohren |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 449–498 |
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Wages as signals of worker mobility
Yu Chen, Matthew Doyle, and Francisco M. Gonzalez |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 499–549 |
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Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
Özgün Ekici |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 551–564 |
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Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions
Paulo Barelli and Srihari Govindan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 565–582 |
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Optimal sample sizes and statistical decision rules
Sanket Patil and Yuval Salant |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 583–604 |
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Symmetric reduced form voting
Xu Lang and Debasis Mishra |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 605–634 |
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Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent
Yiqiu Chen and Markus Möller |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 635–666 |
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A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making
Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 667–703 |
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Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information
Shanglyu Deng, Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu, and Yuxuan Zhu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 705–742 |
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On competition for spatially distributed resources in networks
Giorgio Fabbri, Silvia Faggian, and Giuseppe Freni |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 743–781 |
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Direct implementation with evidence
Soumen Banerjee, Yi-Chun Chen, and Yifei Sun |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 783–822 |
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Relational enforcement
Peter Achim and Jan Knoepfle |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 823–863 |
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Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good
Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 865–915 |
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Contracting over persistent information
Wei Zhao, Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou, and Tristan Tomala |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 917–974 |