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Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps
Brian Baisa and Justin Burkett |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–28 |
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Learning by matching
Yi-Chun Chen and Gaoji Hu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 29–56 |
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Performance-maximizing large contests
Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 57–88 |
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Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information
Fabrizio Germano, Jonathan Weinstein, and Peio Zuazo-Garin |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 89–122 |
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Agency business cycles
Mikhail Golosov and Guido Menzio |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 123–158 |
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Coalition formation and history dependence
Bhaskar Dutta and Hannu Vartiainen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 159–197 |
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First-price auctions with budget constraints
Maciej H. Kotowski |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 199–237 |
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Locally Bayesian learning in networks
Wei Li and Xu Tan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 239–278 |
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Willpower and compromise effect
Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Daisuke Nakajima, and Emre Ozdenoren |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 279–317 |
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Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint
Tibor Heumann |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 319–359 |
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Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods
Brian Baisa |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 361–413 |
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Network structure and naive sequential learning
Krishna Dasaratha and Kevin He |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 415–444 |
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The no-upward-crossing condition, comparative statics, and the moral-hazard problem
Hector Chade and Jeroen M. Swinkels |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 445–476 |
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Delegating performance evaluation
Igor Letina, Shuo Liu, and Nick Netzer |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 477–509 |
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Mechanism design without quasilinearity
Tomoya Kazumura, Debasis Mishra, and Shigehiro Serizawa |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 511–544 |
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Bundlers' dilemmas in financial markets with sampling investors
Milo Bianchi and Philippe Jehiel |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 545–582 |
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Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
Dino Gerardi and Lucas Maestri |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 583–623 |
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Multiplier effect and comparative statics in global games of regime change
Michal Szkup |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 625–667 |
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Equilibrium coalitional behavior
Mert Kimya |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 669–714 |
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Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent
Daniel Barron, George Georgiadis, and Jeroen M. Swinkels |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 715–761 |
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The construction of national identities
Milena Almagro and David Andrés-Cerezo |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 763–810 |
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Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information
Wei He and Yeneng Sun |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 811–859 |
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Production priorities in dynamic relationships
Jean Guillaume Forand and Jan Zapal |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 861–889 |
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Short-term investments and indices of risk
Yuval Heller and Amnon Schreiber |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 891–921 |
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Costly verification in collective decisions
Albin Erlanson and Andreas Kleiner |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 923–954 |
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Robust scoring rules
Elias Tsakas |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 955–987 |
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Twisting the truth: foundations of wishful thinking
Matthew Kovach |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 989–1022 |
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Uncertainty-driven cooperation
Doruk Cetemen, Ilwoo Hwang, and Ayça Kaya |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1023–1058 |
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Preferences for partial information and ambiguity
Jian Li |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1059–1094 |
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School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance
Andrew Kloosterman and Peter Troyan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1095–1133 |
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Optimal incentive contract with endogenous monitoring technology
Anqi Li and Ming Yang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1135–1173 |
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Common learning and cooperation in repeated games
Takuo Sugaya and Yuichi Yamamoto |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1175–1219 |
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Optimal dynamic matching
Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee, and Leeat Yariv |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1221–1278 |
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On the falsifiability and learnability of decision theories
Pathikrit Basu and Federico Echenique |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1279–1305 |
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Transferable utility and demand functions
Pierre-André Chiappori and Elisabeth Gugl |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1307–1333 |
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Gradual pairwise comparison and stochastic choice
Rohan Dutta |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1335–1364 |
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Trade clustering and power laws in financial markets
Makoto Nirei, John Stachurski, and Tsutomu Watanabe |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1365–1398 |
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Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1399–1434 |
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On the optimal design of biased contests
Qiang Fu and Zenan Wu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1435–1470 |
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Learning with minimal information in continuous games
Sebastian Bervoets, Mario Bravo, and Mathieu Faure |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1471–1508 |
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An explicit representation for disappointment aversion and other betweenness preferences
Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, David Dillenberger, and Pietro Ortoleva |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1509–1546 |
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Collusion and delegation under information control
Andreas Asseyer |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1547–1586 |
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The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments
Dmitry Ryvkin and Mikhail Drugov |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1587–1626 |
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The wisdom of the crowd in dynamic economies
Pietro Dindo and Filippo Massari |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1627–1668 |
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Private and public liquidity provision in over-the-counter markets
David M. Arseneau, David E. Rappoport W., and Alexandros P. Vardoulakis |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1669–1712 |