

Corrigendum to “Rationing rules and stable coalition structures” [Theoretical Economics 13 (2018), 933–950]

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Gallo and Inarra (2018) requires the following two corrections.¹

Lemma 2 in Gallo and Inarra (2018) states the necessity of Axioms 1 and 2 to induce hedonic games that satisfy the weak pairwise alignment property. However, its proof shows that Axioms 1 and 2 are also sufficient. Therefore, this lemma should be stated as follows:

Lemma 2 (Gallo and Inarra (2018)). *A rule induces an hedonic game that satisfies the weak pairwise alignment property if and only if it satisfies Axioms 1 and 2.*

Theorem 2 in Gallo and Inarra (2018) states that a rule induces hedonic games with stable coalition structures if and only if it satisfies Axioms 1 and 2. However, the proof shows that these axioms are sufficient, but not necessary, to guarantee stability. Therefore, this theorem should be stated as follows:

Theorem 2 (Gallo and Inarra (2018)). *If rule F satisfies Axioms 1 and 2, then it induces hedonic games with stable coalition structures.*

References

ALCALDE-UNZU, J., O. GALLO, E. INARRA, AND J. D. MORENO-TERNERO (2024): “Solidarity to achieve stability,” *European Journal of Operational Research*, 315, 368–377.

GALLO, O. AND E. INARRA (2018): “Rationing rules and stable coalition structures,” *Theoretical Economics*, 13, 933–950.

GALLO, O. AND B. KLAUS (2024): “Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, 147, 485–516.

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¹Both errors have been already mentioned in recent papers (see footnote 3 in Gallo and Klaus (2024) and in Alcalde-Unzu et al. (2024) respectively).